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A STUDY OF THE UTILITY

AND VALIDITY OF EARNINGS FORECASTS

Michael P. Howell

Prepared for the Kalamazoo Chapter of National Association of
Accountants, and Western Michigan University Accounting Honors'
Program.

INTRODUCTION

According to William J. Casey the past Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and recently appointed Under Secretary of

State of Economic Affairs, forecasting should be the first and most
important priority of all areas of management and public accounting.

It has been the avowed contention of Mr. Casey and various other

administrators of the S.E.C., that only large institutional investment
corporations have had access to such "useful" information when needed.
Consequently, according to Mr. Casey and others, large investors are
able to make more objective and intelligent investment decisions.

A

recent independent survey done for the Financial Executives Institute

came to a totally different conclusion than that which Mr. Casey has
drawn.

It was determined that few investment corporations veritably

have access to pertinent internal forecasting models.

In fact, when

interviewed, many executives claimed that even if they could procure
Such information, they seriously doubted whether they would rely on
it.

Most institutional investors surveyed felt that such reports are very

short on objectively verifiable fact, and very long on conjecture.
Ever since the late I9601s the Securities and Exchange Commission

has been holding meetings on the probability of implementing a program
of earnings iorecast preparation, and publishing.

Just recently they

-2-

held a meeting on that especially thorny question of public forecast
disclosure—a problem whose solution the Commission itself still is
■ ••

not Sure of.

The question that was entertained by the commission is;

whether corporations should be allowed, or possibly, compelled, to
issue forecasts of their earnings in prospectuses, proxy statements,

or reports filed with the S.E.C.

Not only has the S.E.C. entertained

notions of disclosing forecasts, but they have also mentioned that the
accounting profession may be asked or required, to verify, or possibly

assist in preparation of 1;he public forecast reports.
Much ctltioism has been levied recently by accountants and
■jr

management alike in respect to the disclosure and publishing of

forecasts. 'But, unfortunately most of this criticism has been directed,
at the wong problems of forecasting.
the proWems ff forecasting:

Here are typical opinions about

Arthur Andersen and Co. strongly opposes

forecasting, due to their belief that it will destroy the independence,

>

that C,P.A♦ firibi so strongly revere.
|

,.

• -v.;

November 4# 1972, reports that:

The Business Week issue of

"Whether profit forecasts are made

^cc^piiisory of voluntary, and whether a forecast requirement applies

to all companies or only to new issues, the general question has
Stirred lip considerable concern in management ranks.

The big worry

Is liability a^tibns if a public forecast misses the mark, and a share
holder thinks he has been stung.

Executives also fear that a forecast

gone awry can make them look inept in the eyes of investors."

All of the aforementioned apprehensions are understandable, but
all of these criticisms tend to "miss the boat."

They fail to pinpoint

the paramount issue of forecasting; validity and accuracy.

Accountants

in theory and also in practice have long adhered to the dogma of
"consistency" and "reliability" in their reports.

My concern is not

only with aberrations from the doctrine of consistency and reliability,
but more important with the validity and achieveability of financial

forecasts.
The objective of this paper will be to delineate, and disclose,

the *'shortcoming" of economic (earning) forecasting.

If it can be

^n^quivocafcly proven that forecasting is merely conjecture, and
intelligent guesswork, that often is inaccurate, then it is my contention
that it will be superfluous for accountants to continually lament their
apprehension about financial forecasting.

Historically the "crystal

ball" techniques of forecasters have proven to be repeatedly unreliable
and inaccurate.

Some of the preeminent economists in the U.S. have

proven to-bet*distantly off base, in their predictions of various facets
of economic movement.

argument.

This will be my departure point, and primary

If economists are unable to consistently resolve the

quj^dary of forecasting, how will accountants, even at the micro
level, joe a We to surmount this barrier?

If accountants do accept

the responsibility of preparing, or verifying,, any type of forecasts,

1 foresee polemicists such as Abraham J. Briloff, the author of
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Unaccountable Accounting finding an unlimited supoly of contradictions
and "juicy" scandals to entertain the reading public.
The most likely areas of major error in forecasting models are
the following:

(1)

Errors in Predicting Income Demand Goi relations

(2)

Low Correlation Between Future of a Particular Firm
in an Industry, or an Industry in General

(3)

Aggregate Models Traditionally Involve Only One
Linear Regression Equation

(4)

Internal Forecasts are Consistently Invalid

(5)

Extrapolation Techniques and Uncertainties Result
in Invalid Observation

(6)

Institutional Changes are not Predictable

I would like to discuss each of the aforementioned difficulties of
forecasting in brief.

Obviously a closer look and analysis of these

problems is necessary, but such endeavor is beyond the scope of
this paper.

ERRORS IN PREDICTING INCOME DEMAND CORRELATIONS
One of the major difficulties in predicting the change in consumption,

relative to the change in income, is the problem of anticipating the
expectation of consumers.

Two of the more common models of the

consumption function are published periodically by the St. Louis

Federal Reserve.

Here are two such models that are applied.

The

first is a three year average based on change in price level and the

"~ 0"~

changes in income c=f (avg. rate of change in P and Y).

The second

model is the very simplified model of; consumption is a function of

income, or c=f(Y).

One must be very careful in utilization of such

aggregate models*

For occassionaly these models are very superficial

in predictive value in that they exclude the effect of change in the money
supply, and changes in consumer expectation.

The effect of changes in

money supply would be very easy to incorporate into the consumption

model, if one could predict the behavior of the infamous Federal Reserve
Board.

Seldom since the-inception of the "Fed", has anyone been able

to foresee, the direction of the "Fed's" monetary policy beforehand.
The second problem of any income consumption model, is much

more perplexing, and difficult to define then the impulsive behavior
of the "Fed. "

the consumer?

How do forecasters predict the level of expectation of

How does one include such a variable in a model?

This instability is far from a rarity in the market process.

This

problem is referred to as the "cobweb" effect in economics.

Economists

usually can analyze what caused a "cobweb, " but seldom can they

predict consistently, or accurately, before the fact that a "cobweb"
indeed is forthcoming.

What "cobwebs" indicate to a forecaster, is

that markets need not necessarily produce equilibrium prices.

Occa

sionally at the aggregate, or industry level, management is bewildered
by the paradoxical condition of increasing supply and decreasing demand,
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augmented by decreasing prices.

This is the potentially disturbing

effect of changes in consumer expectations in prices and outputs.

As

consumer expectations do change, the motive of self-interest will

drive buyers and sellers in directions that imperil the orderly adjust

ment of the market place.

Often during periods of expected inflation, *

buyers will purchase in excessive amounts, and drive the price of a
good above its market equilibrium, which would certainly make a
forecast look good.

Conversely, in times of falling prices, if the

consumer expects prices to keep falling, what will the buyers self-

interest guide him to do?

As a buyer, one will not buy more, because

one figures, quite correctly, that if one holds off one will get things

still cheaper tomorrow*.

This price decline is further augmented by

the apprehension of the seller.

As a seller, he will not offer less,

because he fears if he does not sell as much as he can immediately,
he will get ev$n lower prices for his product tomorrow.

Thus, in

^ of stabilizing reactions, that bring a halt to price changes, or
ma|r even initiate price reversals, when expectations themselves
■.■&

based on runaway price changes, they bring about behavior that
oreates the very situation feared.

As buyers hold back, and sellers

rufih forward, the Imbalance between quantities supplied, and quantities
demanded will worsen, causing a precipitous decline in prices.

What all this means to the forecaster is that he can not be assured,
that the market will react according to any model or forecast he may
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establish.

Consequently, forecasters are unable to make consistent

sales forecasts.

If there was a means, of including a consumer

behavior variable, into a model, then a micro-economic model of
income-price-quantity would possess a higher degree of validity,

and probability of coming true.

LOW CORRELATION BETWEEN FUTURE OF FIRM OR INDUSTRY AND
INCOME OR ANY OTHER AGGREGATE MEASURE
Not all industries, and not all firms within an industry, react
to changes in income in a similar manner.

A firm within a given

industry, should be very careful about changes in income and the
effect upon demand for the firm's product.

It happens often, that

as income is rising, their is a positive correlation for the industry's

product, and a negative correlation for the product of a firm in that
industry./ Also, there have been cases where the national real income
has been rising, yet the demand for the product of a particular industry

has been decreasing.

Essentially, what this implies is that firms

should be aware of the possibility of its sales moving in opposite
direction to the sales of the industry.

Also, it may mean, that a firms'

sales may move at a slower rate, or faster rate, than the industry as a
whole.

These factors are influenced by many variables,

such as

geographical location relative to the entire industry, variances in income

distribution, and local, state, or federal tax law changes.

EXTRAPOLATION TECHNIQUES CAN BE 1NGONSISTENT

The conventional business forecast presents a detailed analyzes

of the individual G.N.P. components, it add-, the separate estimates and
hence derives a total G.N.P. estimate for the period ahead.

The typical

G.N.P. model includes the following sectors:
(1)

Consumption Sector

(2)

Public Investment Sector

(3)

Government Sector

(4)

Expert Sector

Thus G.N.P. = C+I+G+E.

One must be very careful when utilizing G.N.P.

as an indicator, because year to year comparisons may not be adjusted and
reflect any price level changes.

One of the advantages of using a G.N.P.

indicator for forecasting purposes is that it will force internal consistency.

In other words, by using G.N.P. , double counting is avoided and all
components of the economy are included.
True, the forecaster will be using an infinite number of estimates

that are consistent, but only one is correct.

One can make a forecast

more logical by precluding inconsistencies, but the use of good logic

does not always result in accuracy.

The tendency in the past has been

fdr some forecasters to project the known into the unknown, or to extend

recent trends of the economy, the industry, or the firm into the future.

This extrapolation technique has worked well quite often in the past, but
on occasion has experienced dismal failure.

Extrapolation works well

when movement is in a traditional trend direction, but extrapolation fails
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when profit and prediction accuracy is most needed, at. the turning point
of the business cycle.

Once again the accoununt would be confronted

with the question of validity and achievability of his forecast.

Under ordinary circumstances, extract bating past trends may be a
reasonable enough way of projecting the future.

always are economic circumstances ordinary:

But unfortunately not

"For example since 1966,

the two critical components of growth-increases in productivity and in
the labor force-upon which all aggregate forecasts ultimately rest, have
departed widely from their long-term trends.

Since 1966, productivity

growth in the private economy has averaged only about 1.6 percent a year,

only half the long term trend of 3 to 3.2 percent.

The labor force has shot

up by more than 2 percent a year since 1965, a third higher than its longterm trend."

3

Therefore one can rightfully assume that extrapolation of

economic growth components is not always valid.
The following data will statistically support my previous contention

that extrapolation of G.N.P., or any other leading indicator, need not
necessarily result in accurate sales or profit forecasts for a particular

industry or firm.

In the first quarter of 1972, G.N.P. seasonally adjusted/

rose at an annual rate of 12.0 percent.
changes, the rise was 5.6 percent.

When adjusted for price level

During the same first quarter of 1972,

the transportation industry experienced a decrease in before tax profits
of 2.4 percent.

Every first quarter between 1963 and 1972 when there

was an increase in G.N.P.

(real) the transportation industry experienced
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an increase in before tax profits.
of 1972?

Why the deviation in the first quarter

There could be innumerable reasons for this variance.

The

veritable reason is that extrapolation is not a consistently reliable
analytical tool.

Extrapolation of one leading indicator, or a combination

of leading indicators will not give one an accurate result all of the time.
Suffice it to say that projections, and extrapolation, of historical data,

and trends for the intent of earnings forecast is an exercise of dubious
utility.

Certainly, extrapolation and use of long term trends are not

scripts for forecasters that should be followed point by point without

departure; as I mentioned earlier in this section.

Both G.N.P. , and

its components, fluctuate somewhat above or below their normal trend,

depending on the point of the business cycle that is being analyzed.
But when the basic components depart wide margins from their longterm trends for a long period of time, it seems reasonable to inquire

about the usefulness and accuracy of the trends themselves as an
analytical tool.

Baryl Sprinkel, the noted economist, has had much to say about

leading indicators such as G.N.P.

Here is Mr. Sprinkel1 s analysis;

"Indicators give what on hindsight prove to be false signals.

But
•4

unfortunately we search for a foresight mechanism which does not exist."

Many attempts have been made to devise mathematical methods of processing
leading indicator data, thereby eliminating irregular movements, but
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unfortunately erratic movement still remains.

Accordingly, Mr. Sprinkel

through past research has come to this not so optimistic conclusion:
"The difficulties of using indicators are formidable.

In interrupting

current changes we are sometimes confronted with false signals, pauses

in the underlying trend, variability in the performance of our most trusted
series, shifts in attitudes arising from external events, and errors of
measurements.

However, while the inherent difficulties of forecasting

changes in our vast and complicated economy may be reduced, they will
never be completely eliminated, so that we shall always have to contend
with a sizeable margin of error in our forecasts."

Do accountants want to take the responsibility of a sizeable margin
of error?

Will investors accept forecasts that are susceptible to a

sizeable margin of error?

Would investors be better off if they Ignored

external earnings forecast?

A wise professor of business forecasting,

the late Garfield V. Cox, once responded to a student's question
concerning how he was able to reach a precise quantification of his views

about the future state of business:
statistical projection of the future.

"I am always uncomfortable with any
I therefore choose the statistical

projection with which I am least uncomfortable and thereby minimize

my discomfort."

That is fine for a scholar who wishes to minimize

discomfort, but what the investor is concerned with is maximizing

profits, and minimizing losses, not necessarily minimizing "discomfort."
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT AFFECT PROFITS AND ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY THAT ARE UNPREDICTABLE
Below is listed a group of variables and indico'ors that one might

incorporate (depending on project) into a simulated model, that can be
utilized to get a realistic, and probable forecast of future earnings:

(1) G.N.P., (2) industrial production index,
(4) new order durable goods,

(3) personal income,

(5) bank rates on short, term loans,

rates on commercial and industrial loans,

(7) money supply,

(6) bank

(8) unemploy

ment rate, and (9) common stock prices; these are just a token sample
of the type of information one would need to make a reasonably attainable
forecast.

But what of the numerous forces that one cannot predict, with

any degree of certainty.

These unpredictable variables cannot be included

in a simulated earnings mode, but can make or break any simple, or

sophisticated forecast.
Economic activity may be affected by political developments, both
domestic and foreign, that are noneconomic in character, and usually are
not encompassed in the indicator statistical system; neverless, they have

important economic consequences.

Representative examples of such non-

predictable influences of economic activity include the Korean conflict
during the 1949-53 expansion, which turned out to be unusually long,
the Vietnam War, which stimulated an unusually long inflation, and the

recurring steel and automobile strikes, which severely interrupted pro
duction operations and affected earnings of afflicted industries.

Even
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the threat of strikes may accelerate inventory accumulation, and thus
distort the true profit picture.
The aforementioned cases were just a few examples of howunanticipated institutional changes, can alter an earnings forecast.

Ennumerated below are other potential non-controllable variables to
earnings forecast attainment:

(1)

Wage and Price Controls

(2)

Federal, State, and Local Tax Changes

(3)

Wars (including rioting)

(4)

Federal Reserve Board Actions

(5)

Unions (contracts strikes, and threat of strike)

(6)

Legislation; Both Federal and State, i.e. pollution
standards in automobile and steel industries

(7)

International Trade Regulations, i.e. tariffs, quotas,
expropration

(8)

International Monetary Arrangements

The above are just a random sample of many factors that may cause
disparity between a forecast and actual performance.

UNSUCCESSFUL INTERNAL FORECASTS
A recent study on disclosure directed by Frances M. Wheat,
recommended against any change in the existing policy of not encouraging

the use of forecasts by external users.

Wheat concluded in his study that

"projections in filed documents might become traps for the unsophisticated
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investor who would be prone to attach more significance to such

projections then they deserve."

Small investors tend to rely on

unproven, unemperical types of evidence.

The small investor ordinar

ily does not have the financial capability to have reports analyzed.
Investors may have a tendency to place overt reliability on forecasts,
even if they are forewarned of the inherent inconsistencies.

How successful have internal forecasts been?

That has been

a very difficult question to answer, for many companies do not know
how to forecast their earnings accurately.

"There have been some surveys

recently in which corporate executives were asked to gauge their companies'
success at forecasting earnings.

The conclusion of N.I.R.I. , was that,

when earnings were estimated a year ahead, only about one-sixth of the
companies felt that they could be accurate within 5 percent, and almost
one-half felt that they would be off by more than 10 percent.

7

In a more

comprehensive survey, conducted for the Financial Executives Institute,
70 percent of the companies said that their internal forecasts were
generally accurate within 10 percent.

But even in this survey, only

37 percent said that they came within 5 percent, and 13 percent said
that they were off by more than 20 percent.
Certainly no C.P.A. firm would care to verify the report of one

of the 13 percent companies that was off by 20 percent.

A 20 percent

deviation from a projection could seriously impair investor confidence
and trust in management, and any C.P.A. firm that may publish or

verify their reports.
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Historically, internal forecasts have not had a very good "batting average."
Therefore/ I would hope that accounting firms would maintain a laissez

faire policy toward forecasting.

It would be my guess, that had any

accounting firm verified the forecast, of any firm in the oral contraceptive

industry in 1970, they would still be trying to get out of Civil Court.
Because, the earnings forecast of oral contraceptive firms, in that year,
turned out to be an astounding 124 percent high.

IS FORECASTING FOOLISH
Based upon evidence that I have acquired, there seems to be but
one conclusion and fate for forecasting:

failure.

That may be a harsh

criticism, for certain aspects of forecasting are very useful as internal

control tools.

Forecasting as it stands now will be neither an effective,

nor valid, means of communication between the firm and the external user.

A recent report of a committee of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants set forth the long-range objectives of the accounting profession

The following "Keys to Successful Data Communication" were provided by
its report:

(1)

the issuer and user must have an understanding as to standards
for measurement and summarization.

(2)

the issuer must have the requisite knowledge and skills to
carry out antecedent steps leading up to, and to prepare the
communication.

(3)

There must be absence of bias in communication to a humanly
feasible extent.
o

(4)

The communication must be intelligible to the user.
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The only preceding criteria the accountant is equipped to meet, is

number 3.

Very few investors have sufficient knowledge to understand

the implications, or weaknesses of a sophisticated forecast.

Ordinarily,

accountants and management do not have the requisite knowledge to

construct complex simulated models, that are necessary to have
reasonably consistent and reliable results.
"Common comprehension by the profession and the statement

users as to these generally accepted principles of accounting was

described by Andrew Bar, Chief Accountant for the S.E.C., as probably
the most common and basic problem confronting the accounting profession
today."

9

Attempting to forecast certainly will not lend itself to a

mitigation of this omnipresent problem.

Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Maryland Appellate Court said
recently:

"Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers

in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases."

That

very statement of the esoteric character of accounting might go like
this if accountants were to take part in forecasting:

"Forecasting

concepts are a foreign language to all lawyers, in all cases, and to

almost every investor, in nearly every case. "
It is very unlikely that accountants will be able to take a highly

sophisticated forecast, prepare it in an objective way, and also make it
intelligible to the user.

Statement #4 of the accounting board defines the meaning of the
seven sacrosanct characteristics of financial accounting, they are:

relevance, understanding, reliability, verifiability, neutrality, timeliness,
comparability, and completeness.

If accountants volunteered, or were

compelled to accept the ominous task of forecast preparation, or verification,
it would best serve our purpose to delete all but 2 or 3 oi the aforementioned
tenets.

It is my belief, that forecasting can continue to serve a useful
purpose in preparation of cost budgets.

Conversely, it is my strongest

conviction, that earnings forecasts, as a supplementary statement to

annual reports, will serve no useful or meaningful purpose to the outside
user.

Such chimera will result in an ineluctable credibility conflict

between user and preparer.

Who stands to lose the most?

Not the

firm who sells more stock, not the accountant who obtains additional

clients, but the small investor who invests in a glamorized stock, resulting
from an ^inadvertently inflated forecast.

The very person William J. Casey

intended to protect, will experience the "blunt of the blow."
In closing I would recommend that one does not make the erroneous

analogy between the S.E.C.'s recommendation for earnings forecasts, and
the United Kingdom's relative success at forecasting.

In the United Kingdom

accountants only prepare forecasts for mergers and combinations, whereas
in the United States the S.E.C. has recommended publication and disclosure
of earnings forecast in annual or semi-annual reports to stockholders.
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relation 'Analysis

As A tool

For Forecasting

811 Lilly and Company, manufacturers of drugs and
pharnaceuticals, have lon^; made use of correlation analyeia

between

sales'

and

a'well

known

leading

income

aeries. Study and Investigation by company specialists
had revealed a very definite relation oetween the sales
&f Pharmaceuticals and disposaDle personal Income.
TO# company

followed this

lead

and

developed

a

wnole

ifiitera of forecasting based on the relation of sales to

movements

in

personal

disposable

income.

Sfrdus try ,ffpt jjftpee as ts

g ho forecasters of El li~ Lilly it is usually

to forecast

the

sales

of am entire

industry

than

tt Si %q forecast the sales of a particular company
wi;<ifclii that industry*
The reason for this is that the

foundation of forecasting,

the facts and figurestare

most generally Igvaljable on an industry wide basis,
Eli Lilly was''Wost£&rtunate in having at its disposal
tillable, data oQ total industry sales on ethical drug

sales♦ " ^M.,
'
■■';■■.
*fter a#|pfcting,|>0tJ& 'industry sales and the income
figures fW<.ppiae^''■bli^agec, Sie company found through
coifrelatioi anilysifi that the following relation

•jEistfdifor eT#ryi0-percent growth or decline in dis

posable pjHtyqtofeal. in#ome,the

irwlustrys

sales

show a

CorreBpondii^g 4maf|«&M» of decrease of about 5 perc^jjtt.
5$|e frcm this X01tietme9analysis of the record reved a.#|e||dy ^aie of growth ia pnarraaceuticals sales,
oil tfc#\M$kpanj^ attributes to constantly increasing

' |ac|MK|di"to»reib -for fesearch, and tiae resulting new major
product'"developeraents. As loiig as researcli enjp#ttditures
continue to inej»9i^# and the new products are evoif«d

fke

pg ,0«ii#t#8 that this trend will continue.

Knowing^ thic

tr%«i<if

and the resulting relationship to

^^il 4is po 9 able lACorae, Indus try sales can &e foreca
st fry use of this forittuia:
v
In&litry Voiui|#«I^aome(weighted)xGrowtii Trend

Evidence that i3 available to forecasters of thg-'dviig
in#*lltry indicates that it Is apparent that thir am$a.ny

%s 1% a position to derive a forecast of total industry

sales when data that

is

y ForteaetB
e 8till regained

accurate

is

availaoe

the problem of

on income

estimating what

portion of the jkQ|feca8t«d sales of the industry woul<l
Oe obtained

oy the company..

Thie

estimate

is

obtained

studying the share of tiie national market the co«obtained iyi pas| years and projecting the t»aati of

partioipatioiai itito the future.

In

order

to

do

a good

jod,

management,

feels

that

the

reasons underlying the pattern or pi. t
^r*:" ■iiiianco must
oe understood if future trends are ?.j b-- evaluated prop
erly. In this connection considera' ■ n i- given, to sucn
pertinent details a? relative manui x^ti« •: n;: capacity,
general customer acceptance of the ; ;,r ■ i: ,v
products,
company research expenditures, and !> <■ estinii'.ei effect

of

each of these or past anc , re; oec 11 ve rr-u*<t? performance.
Tne company nas reported good oU'^es? *;th tais method,
pointing out that in some recent years "orecasts of total
company sales,made more than a year in advance,have been
witnin 2 percent of actual saj.es«
The

B.F.

Goodricn

Method

Of

Forecasting

£J.F Goodricn uses these methods to estimate the demand
for passenger car sales.. The long-term forecast of passen
ger car production involves several steps. In the first
step the number of cars in use are considered in relation
to the nations level of income.
The compan/s business
research department compared the number of passenger cars
in operation at the end of xhe year,for a period of years
back to 1930, with the corresponding yeard level of dis
posable personal income* adjusted for changes m purchas
ing power. It was found that the following relationship
exsisted:

for

every million

dollars

of

disposable

income

there were approximately ^00 million passenger cars in use.
!5ne secon&lwtep invoices the preperation of an estimate
of the future trend of disposable personal income based on
certain
growth.

assumptions as to the
The business research

nations potential
department oegms

an economic forecast of gross Rational

economic
oy making

product(Gr.N.P.)

which measures the sum of total goods produced oy the nat
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